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From Old Thinking
to New Thinking in
Qualitative Research

New versus Old Thinking in Qualitative Research

Stephen G. Brooks
and William C.
Wohlforth

R

obert English has
provided a strongly written critique of our article “Power, Globalization, and
the End of the Cold War.”1 Unfortunately, his reply may have the unintended
consequence of reinforcing a pernicious but popular view among political scientists that qualitative research—especially on single cases—cannot generate
progress. Here we have a case of seminal importance that has attracted the sustained attention of dozens of international relations scholars for more than a
decade, and yet it appears that scholars are still involved in what looks like an
interminable historians’ debate over causes. In this article we show that such a
reaction would be utterly unjustiªed.
We have two basic responses. First, much of English’s critique misses the
mark because it is based on a misunderstanding of our research design. Second, his reply is nonetheless a test of our major ªndings conducted by a skeptical and talented researcher. Our analysis passes this tough test, though English
does advance some useful criticisms.
We proceed in four sections. First, we show that major progress has been
made in explaining the end of the Cold War and establishing its theoretical implications. The debate now turns mainly on how to assess the causal implications of widely accepted ªndings, which is why issues of qualitative research
design are so important. In the second section, we demonstrate the importance
of moving beyond the framework of necessary and sufªcient conditions toward a more probabilistic approach. Because it is constrained by the old framework, English’s reply cannot directly engage much of our analysis. Third, we
explain how we designed our research on this case to assess endogeneity. A
failure to appreciate why and how we tackled this key issue is the source of
English’s serious—and wrong—charge that our research was “biased.” The
fourth section addresses English’s most central empirical challenge concerning
hard-line alternatives to Soviet retrenchment. In this case, as in so many others,
Stephen G. Brooks is Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. William C. Wohlforth is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.
For their helpful comments, we would like to thank Jennifer Lind, Daniel Markey, and especially
Andrew Stigler.
1. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold
War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/
01), pp. 5–53. Further references appear parenthetically in the text.
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 93–111
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arguments over possible alternatives to the course actually chosen are crucial
and so rigor is at a premium.
The issues at stake here concern not just the end of the Cold War or even the
study of ideas in international relations, but qualitative research more generally. None of the methodological challenges we highlight has a generally accepted answer in social science.2 In our article we sought to apply new
thinking to these challenges. English’s article shows that we were not entirely
successful in articulating our method for accomplishing this goal. This symposium gives us a chance to do so.

Making Progress in Explaining the End of the Cold War
Ten years ago, the conventional wisdom held that Soviet material decline—
often measured solely in terms of military capabilities—was small or nonexistent; that this factor consequently had little causal weight in the end of the Cold
War; and thus that other variables, particularly ideational ones, carried the
day.3 A second wave of empirical scholarship that emerged in the mid-1990s
shifted the conventional wisdom. At that time, most scholars agreed that
Soviet material decline—measured more accurately in terms of overall capabilities—had actually been quite signiªcant beginning in the early-to-mid 1980s
and that it did play a signiªcant causal role.4 Still, the standard conclusion was
that even though decline did prompt change in Soviet foreign policy, the resulting shift could have just as easily been toward aggression or a new version
of muddling through (rather than retrenchment) and that other factors played
the key role in resolving this uncertainty.5
Though the tone of his article might lead readers to overlook it, English actually concurs with two of our most important ªndings—each of which differed
sharply from the previous conventional wisdom. First, we found that the ecoFrom Old Thinking to New Thinking

2. Helpful discussions of these issues include Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba,
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientiªc Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, Case Studies and
Theory Development (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).
3. See, for example, Charles Kegley, “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist
Myths and the New International Realities,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June
1993), pp. 131–146.
4. See, for example, Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy,
1985–1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); and William C. Wohlforth, “Realism
and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 91–129.
5. See, for example, Robert Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security,” in Peter J.
Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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nomic burden on the Soviet Union was far greater than the second wave of
scholarship had realized. Three factors stand out: (1) Soviet decline was more
marked, occurred earlier, and generally placed a much greater strain on maintaining the foreign policy status quo than scholars had previously assumed; (2)
the costs of Soviet isolation from the globalization of production were growing
rapidly; and (3) the Soviet Union “arguably confronted modern history’s worst
case of imperial overstretch” (p. 22). English does not challenge this analysis,
which comprises 40 percent of our article (pp. 14–27, 34–42), and ºatly accepts
that the Soviet Union represented “modern history’s most overextended
empire.”6
The second ªnding concerns endogeneity, in particular, the role of economic
constraints in propelling the translation of new thinkers’ ideas into policy. We
found that the Soviet Union’s declining material fortunes was the key factor
that made the new thinkers’ ideas saleable to those skeptical of retrenchment.
English agrees, noting that Gorbachev found that “stressing economic necessity” was the “best” way to “sell his proposals” to his “main opposition . . . such committed old thinkers as [Yegor] Ligachev” and others in the
Politburo.7
It is thus clear that empirical research is generating real progress on this case.
These two new ªndings alone have substantially moved the debate forward.
English’s response is wholly focused on how to assess empirically the causal
effect of the material constraints we examined. The rest of this article is consequently devoted to this issue.

Probability, Not Determinism: Avoiding the “Straw Man Bias”
English’s reply exempliªes a pervasive problem in qualitative research: the
lack of a good general language for expressing levels of causality within a case.
6. Robert D. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End: A Reply to Brooks
and Wohlforth,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 70–92. English does, however, question the signiªcance of the Soviet Union’s rapid decline, arguing that “most of the leadership” had not cared much about the country’s relative position since “the late 1960s” and was
instead “mired in corruption, often oblivious to foreign and even domestic economic trends, and
largely content to muddle through indeªnitely.” Ibid., p. 72. Doubtless some Soviet ofªcials did
not care much about the country’s international position. But our analysis centered on Soviet foreign policy change, and our attention was consequently focused on the country’s foreign policy
elite, which analysts agree was keenly focused on the country’s international standing. Moreover,
as we show on pp. 21–27 of our article, there are four overlapping reasons why “the Soviet Union’s
international position made its grand strategy more sensitive to relative decline than were the
strategies of other modern great powers” (p. 21).
7. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 81.
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The popular language of necessity and sufªciency simply cannot capture the
debate among scholars who all agree that such major causal factors as “ideas”
and material incentives will always be necessary but insufªcient to explain any
important outcome. Lacking any better terminology for expressing their
claims, however, qualitative researchers often fall prey to what might be called
the “straw man bias”: That is, they cast others’ arguments as deterministic in
order to highlight the signiªcance of their own otherwise unremarkable
ªnding that a different causal factor is necessary to explain a given event. The
result is a literature bedeviled by the imputation to others of obviously untenable claims that some factor wholly determines an outcome, which are then
countered by obvious, and therefore banal, counterclaims that some other factor is really necessary for a complete explanation. The costs imposed by this
practice become evident when we review English’s speciªc claims regarding
our research.
debunking a straw man
Four examples of how English discusses our more detailed analysis serve to
make our larger point. First, English stresses that there was no “consensus for
strategic retreat” among old thinkers, and they were not all simply “‘free riding’ on initiatives with which they actually agreed.”8 We never claimed otherwise. Rather, we found that “a solid consensus emerged in the political
leadership on the need for downsizing the military and scaling back the costs
of empire. . . . Even many elements in the military leadership and the defenseindustrial sector agreed on the general need to reduce the imperial burden”
(p. 33).9
Second, English shows that the new thinkers “held beliefs motivated by ideals,” and their ideas did not spring directly from rising economic constraints.10
Again, we never suggested otherwise. Instead, we found that “many policymakers and intellectuals who became idea entrepreneurs did so in part as they
learned of the material failings of the Soviet system. And their ideas became
saleable to those more skeptical about reform in signiªcant part because they
accorded with undeniable material trends” (p. 44).
8. English for some reason repeatedly uses the terms “retreat” or “strategic retreat” instead of “retrenchment” to describe the change in Soviet foreign policy we analyzed. Because we believe that
retrenchment—dramatic departure though it was—did not become full-scale “retreat” in most
people’s mind until 1989 or later, we studiously avoided this hindsight-laden word.
9. We have added emphasis here to the word “political” because of its great importance in accurately describing our empirical ªndings, because English obviously misses the signiªcance of this
key qualiªer, and because he leaves it out when quoting from our article.
10. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 88.
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Third, English notes that Soviet old thinkers did try to “delay arms control
progress” and obstruct “attempts to put Soviet-Western relations on a new
footing.”11 We agree. We simply found that “the extraordinary feature of the
new evidence concerning Soviet conservatives and hard-liners is not that
many of them opposed speciªc concessions to the West (especially regarding
arms control, such as the inclusion of the Oka missile in the INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] talks, counting rules for strategic missiles on bombers,
etc.), but how very many of them accepted the basic picture of the crisis facing
the country outlined by Gorbachev. . . . Each special interest tried to defend itself while admitting, or acquiescing to, the general need for change. Adding up
these particular objections did not by itself amount to a plausible general alternative to retrenchment” (pp. 45–46, 49).
Fourth, English discusses evidence that Gorbachev’s “skill as a political tactician” was helpful in overcoming obstructionism from skeptical ofªcials.12 We
never denied Gorbachev’s political skills, but simply found that highlighting
economic constraints was his most effective strategy for convincing those
skeptical of foreign policy retrenchment and, in turn, that “the escalating economic costs of maintaining the foreign policy status quo. . . . systematically undercut the ability of Gorbachev’s critics to come up with a compelling general
foreign policy alternative” (p. 50).
In each of these instances, English translates our probabilistic ªnding into an
obviously untenable deterministic one. And the same problem applies to our
broader analysis. We found that the economic costs of maintaining Moscow’s
Cold War foreign policy were rapidly escalating, generating strong and growing incentives to retrench. Throughout his article, English is at pains to show
that Gorbachev and company did not always act out of narrow rational calculation but rather deep normative conviction; that they sometimes did not see
their policies as a strategic retreat but as a leap forward into a better world. All
of this is true, but none of it bears on our ªndings. Incentives affect behavior by
altering the relative costs of various courses of action. Our ªndings do not presuppose that people respond to incentives with automaton-like efªciency.
On the contrary, people have dreams and hopes, they engage in wishful
thinking, they seek to defy or deny incentives, they blunder. Could anyone
with any knowledge of human affairs think otherwise? Over the longer run,
however, changing incentives will tend to push people in certain overall
directions.
11. Ibid., p. 76.
12. Ibid., p. 86.
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In the aggregate, we found that the driving force for embarking on new approaches was less the appeal of a clear forward-looking strategic vision than
the need to move away from the costly practices of the past. As William Odom
puts it, “The most remarkable thing about the beginnings of Gorbachev’s new
military policy [was] the lack of a well-developed analytic basis for it. . . . Its
motive, in contrast, was clear. A surprisingly broad consensus existed among
most of the Soviet elite that the Soviet economy was in serious trouble and that
the burden of military expenditures was much to blame” (p. 115). The same
goes for the Soviets’ sporadic efforts to put relations with Eastern Europe on a
new footing. The documentary evidence that has come to light strongly endorses Alex Pravda’s initial assessment: “It would be unrealistic to argue that
the Gorbachev leadership had any well-deªned idea of the relationship they
wished to achieve. They were clearer about past features they wanted to avoid
and the general direction in which the relationship should evolve.”13 What the
Soviets wanted was to reduce the escalating economic burden of subsidies and
other costs associated with their position in Eastern Europe, but their efforts to
do so never added up to a plan for “strategic retreat.” Had the citizens in Eastern Europe not organized to overthrow the existing regimes, the Soviet leadership—Gorbachev included—would have been quite happy to hold on to it.
Ultimately, what changed was the Soviet willingness to pay high costs to maintain the status quo.
moving beyond necessity and sufficiency
In the end, much of English’s empirical analysis is effective only at debunking
a nonexistent straw man—namely, the argument that economic constraints
made retrenchment “unavoidable” and that ideas did “not play a causal
role.”14 Neither in our larger conclusions nor in our evaluation of more discrete
patterns of evidence did we advance a deterministic claim. On the contrary, we
carefully evaluated a series of probabilistic hypotheses and reached a series of
probabilistic ªndings. Why then does English misinterpret our analysis as being determinist? We doubt that he deliberately “shifted the goal posts” in his
13. Alex Pravda, “Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe in Transition,” in Pravda, ed., The End of
Outer Empire: Soviet-East European Relations in Transition, 1985–1990 (London: Sage, 1992), p. 7.
Some of this documentary evidence is mentioned in footnote 67 of our article. For more, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Economic Constraints and the End of the Cold War,”
in Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park: Pennsylvania
State University Press, forthcoming); and Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet
Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev—An Analysis Based on New Archival Evidence, Memoirs, and Interviews
(Baden Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), chap. 4.
14. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 72.
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favor to make it easier to critique our argument. Instead, his misinterpretation
likely derives from the problem with which we began this section: the terminology of necessary and sufªcient conditions. The following quotation is telling: “[This is] not to dismiss the importance of the sources that Brooks and
Wohlforth bring to bear or to deny the centrality of material constraints to the
way the Cold War ended. Economic decline was clearly a necessary factor in
the inception of Soviet reforms, and the authors have given us new insights
into how such pressures also played an important facilitating role. But they are
still far from establishing material forces as a sufªcient condition.”15
It is easy to understand why English resorts to the terminology of necessary
and sufªcient conditions. It is a lexicon we all understand. Unfortunately, it is
simply incapable of expressing the issues at stake in this case and, indeed, in
the larger dialogue concerning the relationship between ideas and material incentives. As we were at pains to stress: “Material incentives are never determinate” and, hence, “the question is clearly no longer whether but rather how
and how much ideas matter under different conditions—and how best to
model their inºuence on strategic behavior” (pp. 11, 6).
All qualitative researchers face the challenge of expressing levels of causality. We found that the economic constraints on the Soviet Union were far stronger—and had a greater inºuence on the turn toward retrenchment—than
scholars had realized in the mid-1990s, when the consensus was that material
incentives were necessary but insufªcient to explain Soviet retrenchment. How
should we report this ªnding? Clearly, material shifts were still necessary and
still insufªcient, yet more important than understood previously. We struggled
with this issue and concluded that the best response was to frame our analysis
in probabilistic terms. Thus, we concluded that “given the extent of relative decline, the odds were heavily stacked against those who stood for the status
quo” (p. 33) and that “material incentives systematically undermined alternatives to retrenchment” (p. 50). By this we meant that rather than being simply
one of many equally probable responses to Soviet material decline, retrenchment was the most likely one. Where we erred, and can accept some of the
blame for English misinterpreting our analysis, is that although we carefully
expressed our more detailed ªndings in probabilistic terms, we failed to stress
adequately that our overall ªnding was also probabilistic.
English faced the same challenge of conveying his estimate of causal weight.
Stuck in the conceptual framework of necessity and sufªciency, he paid a price:
He is not prompted to address the issue of probability, with respect to either
15. Ibid., p. 92.

International Security 26:4 100

his own analysis or ours. In the end, English’s powerful prose conceals a weak
argument: that material incentives are not sufªcient to explain the Cold War’s
end, and thus “new thinking” ideas are necessary to explain it—a ªnding we
never questioned. He states that other Soviet responses to decline were possible. Of course they were, though we concluded they were not likely. How
probable does English think these alternatives were? He does not say.

Research Design
Like English, we are totally committed to establishing the empirical details in
this case. Yet if we do not get the research design right, evidence alone cannot
generate progress.
facing up to endogeneity
English concludes that our study “is not a close analysis that weighs competing claims and evidence, but rather one that systematically excludes evidence of
ideas’ causal inºuence.”16 This is wrong. It reºects a profound misunderstanding of our motivation for highlighting the issue of endogeneity and our research design for addressing it.
Endogeneity is clearly one of the most important challenges facing scholars
who study the role of ideas, not just in this case but in social science more generally. We focused on this issue not because we believe “that ideas are just
hooks, or that all phenomena can be reduced to material underpinnings,” but
rather because “this key endogeneity issue has been ignored or marginalized
in recent empirical work on ideas in international relations” (p. 51). The end of
the Cold War is simply a particularly prominent example of this general tendency to give short shrift to endogeneity.
To establish the causal role of ideas, scholars must demonstrate that the intellectual shifts they point to do not have the effects they do because of a
changing material environment. Prior to our article, scholars lacked a comprehensive account of how economic constraints inºuenced Soviet policymakers.
As a result, scholars who focused on the role of ideas were simply not in a position to grapple with endogeneity. Our purpose in providing a fuller account
of the material pressures facing Soviet policymakers was to make this possible.17 Some scholars who focus on the role of ideas have recognized this pur16. Ibid., p. 91.
17. As we noted, “the objective of a more sophisticated approach to the study of ideas is currently
hampered less by the quantity of plausible models than by deªciencies in our understanding of the
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pose of our article.18 English instead misinterprets our effort as being driven by
“a framework that too explicitly privileges the material over the ideational.”19
We see no reason to privilege any causal factor in the abstract. As we
stressed, “Ideas and material incentives clearly work together in complex
ways, and their interaction varies across cases” (p. 11). The precise nature of
this interaction is ultimately an empirical question. Scholars who focus on the
role of ideas, English included, are often extremely concerned about where
scholars should ªrst direct their attention. But this concern is irrelevant to the
literature on the end of Cold War, which has been overwhelmingly preoccupied with establishing the role of ideas.20 English is right; we do not spend
much time directly discussing how ideational shifts might have inºuenced this
case. But that is only because scholars’ intensive focus on this question had already provided the baseline for our analysis.
multiplying observable implications
A second criticism English directs at our empirical analysis is that it is limited
to establishing correlation. This is also wrong. On the contrary, our focus on
endogeneity demanded that we test the hypothesis that ideas strongly
inºuenced events independent of material shifts. To accomplish this, we examined as many speciªc observable implications of this hypothesis as we could.
Perhaps because English misinterprets our research design for addressing
endogeneity, or because he misreads our analysis as deterministic, he neglects
our treatment of these observable implications. They fall into three major
categories.
assessments of material conditions. The conclusion emerging from the
ideas literature on this case is that the underlying ideas held by new thinkers
caused them to perceive the world very differently from old thinkers. This was
a supposition, however, because relatively little data on old thinkers were
available until recently. In our analysis, we found that (1) the ways that new
thinkers and old thinkers perceived trends in the Soviet economy and the
material incentives facing decisionmakers . . . ideational models are crucially dependent on a careful speciªcation of the material incentives facing Soviet decisionmakers” (p. 6).
18. Nina Tannenwald, for example, notes in a recent paper that “for Brooks and Wohlforth, the
proper starting point for assessing the role of ideas is to seek to nail down more tightly how constraining material conditions were. . . . [They] have very productively challenged ideationalists to
tighten their arguments.” Tannenwald, “The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda on Ideas,” paper presented at The Role of Ideas and the End of the
Cold War conference, held at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, June 1–3, 2001.
19. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 91.
20. As examples, footnote 2 of our article lists eighteen prominent studies that focus on the role of
ideas in this case.
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global economy during the 1980s were similar and matched up well with objective indicators; (2) pre-Gorbachev, old-thinking leaders perceived relative
decline and the technological lag a few years after these trends accelerated in
the late 1970s; and (3) during the 1980s many in the Soviet military concluded
that the Soviet Union could not continue to bear the costs of its international
position.
Of these observable implications, English appears to question only the last.
The evidence he marshals, however, once again only undermines a deterministic claim we did not make: that all Soviet military ofªcers concluded that the
country could not long bear the costs of its foreign policy. What we actually reported was the striking fact that many of them recollect having reached this assessment. Worthy of note is that the most exhaustively researched analysis of
the Soviet military in the Gorbachev era reaches an even stronger conclusion:
“In interviews and in their memoirs senior former Soviet military ofªcers uniformly cited the burden of military spending as more than the Soviet economy
could bear.”21
relationship between economic constraints and the scope of policy
change. The ideas literature on this case suggests that the mounting economic problems facing the Soviet Union had relatively little to do with the
rapid escalation in both the scope and depth of foreign policy change. In our
analysis we found that (1) many new thinkers and old thinkers cited growing
economic constraints when initiating foreign policy changes; (2) growing economic pressures made old thinkers increasingly unable to oppose a major shift
in Soviet foreign policy; (3) even for many of the most progressive new thinkers, the process of renouncing old foreign policy stereotypes was difªcult and,
in turn, the complete abandonment of these stereotypes only occurred in 1988–
89; (4) poor Soviet performance relative to the West was a contributing factor to
many new thinkers’ growing dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy; and
(5) Gorbachev and large numbers of ofªcials decided to opt for more radical
foreign policy retrenchment only after the default- option reforms (“acceleration”) had failed to revitalize the Soviet economy.
English’s analysis challenges the last two of these observable implications.
Regarding new thinkers’ intellectual evolution, English again assaults a deterministic claim we never made: namely, that “Western military-economic
power” mechanistically drove the intellectual journey of all new thinkers.22
21. William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1998), p. 225; see also p. 91.
22. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 79.
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What we wrote is that new thinkers’ recollections testify to the inºuence of “either living standards or the military-technological superiority of the West”
(p. 44) on their intellectual evolution. In his book, English himself shows how
new thinkers “emphasized the gathering ‘scientiªc-technological revolution,’
stressed Soviet weakness, and argued for drawing on Western experience to
keep pace.”23 So too do the new thinkers whose recollections he cites to support his assertion that “Western military-economic power ªgure[s] little (if at
all)” in many new thinkers’ intellectual growth.24 English’s critique does nevertheless raise an important point: We should have been clearer that we were
much more concerned with how the new thinkers’ ideas became saleable to
skeptics than with their particular origins.
Regarding the ªfth observable implication noted above—the role of decline
in the shift to more radical retrenchment—English does not deny that the Soviet Union’s most dramatic foreign policy moves were made after 1987. Moreover, he agrees that the “economic downturn in 1988 strengthened arguments
for at least some kinds of reductions.”25 But he stresses that the shift to radical
retrenchment had been Gorbachev’s intention all along. We are far less
conªdent than English in analysts’ ability to discern Gorbachev’s precise expectations and desires at every juncture on the basis of only memoirs and recollections. For this reason, we focused on recently released internal documents
in assessing Gorbachev’s early policies and the transition to more signiªcant
foreign policy change. Moreover, we focused on how other decisionmakers
perceived Gorbachev’s initial course through 1987 and ªnd striking that many
new thinkers and old thinkers criticize Gorbachev for initially moving too
slowly and hesitantly in reining in imperial expenditures.
ideas and responses to material decline. A key theme underlying the
ideas literature on this case is that because they held different ideas, the new
thinkers had dramatically different strategic reactions to observable indications of material change than did old thinkers. In our analysis we found that
(1) beginning in the early 1980s, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and
23. Robert D. English, The Idea of the West: Gorbachev and Intellectual Origins of New Political Thinking
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 143.
24. Examples of English’s sources include Georgy Arbatov, whose Zatianuvsheesia vyzdorovlenie
(1953–1985 gg.) Svidetel’stvo sovremennika [A prolonged recovery (1953–1985): the testimony of a
contemporary] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1991) details his efforts to direct the leadership’s attention to the “scientiªc technological revolution” in the West; and Aleksandr Yakovlev,
whose Muki prochteniia bytiia: Perestroika—nadezhdy i real’nosti [The torments of reading existence:
Perestrokia—hopes and realities] (Moscow: Novosti, 1991) documents his institute’s extensive
analysis of the Soviet Union’s economic and technological decline relative to the West.
25. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 86.
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Konstantin Chernenko each successively labored to constrain Soviet defense
spending; (2) decline was already strongly pushing the pre-Gorbachev leadership toward greater restraint in Eastern Europe; (3) not just new thinkers, but
also many conservative ofªcials strongly supported greater integration with
Western ªrms to try to reduce the growing technological gap; (4) the economic
reform alternatives to Gorbachev’s post-acceleration plan—including the one
favored by conservatives—were all weighted even more heavily to reducing
defense spending; and (5) no evidence of a general alternative to retrenchment
has come to light. English questions only the last of these ªndings. In the next
section, we show that this challenge fails.
Concerning our research design, two points emerge. First, we did everything
possible to conduct tests that went beyond merely establishing correlation to
assess the causal mechanisms in play. Second, we explicitly designed these
tests to evaluate the conclusions that emerged from the ideas literature on this
case. Our overall ªnding was that “many of the basic causal mechanisms that
are featured in ideational models of this case are to a signiªcant degree endogenous to material changes” (p. 51). Although future research may uncover evidence that calls this conclusion into question, English presents none in his
article.

Ideas, Switchmen, and Alternatives
Scholars do not have, and may never devise, ideal procedures for examining
the argument that ideas can switch policy onto certain tracks rather than others. Yet for the study of ideas in international relations to progress, the “switchmen” issue must be addressed with rigor.26 A standard way to do so is to look
at how people with different ideas responded to material change. That is why
we examined new evidence on Soviet hard-liners or old thinkers so carefully,
and why English spends so much of his article trying to undermine it.
looking for alternatives
English agrees that “for all their opposition and delay, most [old thinkers] ultimately acquiesced in Gorbachev’s policies.”27 In our article we found that
hard-liners acquiesced because they could not come up with a coherent gen-

26. See Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions” (1913), H.H. Gerth and
C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958).
27. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 77.
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eral alternative strategy to retrenchment and that this outcome, in turn, was intimately related to mounting material constraints. In short, we found the old
thinkers’ acquiescence to be largely the product of their lack of a good alternative. English, in contrast, sees the old thinkers’ acquiescence as being driven by
other factors. The key question then becomes: Was there an alternative?
Scholars have looked long and hard for evidence of alternatives to Soviet retrenchment. At the time we wrote our article, none had come to light. If any researcher has the motive and the background to uncover evidence of this kind,
it is Robert English. Yet he did not do so. All English is able to offer to support
his contention that some hard-liners did, in fact, have an alternative to retrenchment is an excerpt from an interview with Gen. Makhmut Gareev (deputy chief of the General Staff under Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov) that spells out
three elements of the “alternative” to retrenchment that he and his boss favored: (1) cut and run from third world dependencies; (2) avoid the costly war
in Afghanistan; and (3) cut back on unnecessary military programs by stopping the practice of trying to match the U.S. arsenal weapon for weapon.28 Unmentioned by English are the further reductions that Gareev discusses in the
same interview. Gareev reports that he and Ogarkov also concluded that it was
necessary to reduce the size of the armed forces; scale back the Soviet military
presence in Eastern Europe; cut spending on civil defense and strategic defense; halt production of aircraft carriers; and reduce the number of branches
of the armed forces from ªve to three, including abolishing the PVO Strany
(Air Defense Forces) as an independent branch.29
Two points need to made about the “alternative” spelled out by Gareev.
First, this was in Brezhnev’s time. Had such a policy been adopted then,
it would have been seen as a major retrenchment. After all, it was substantively much more than Gorbachev accomplished in the 1985–88 period that
English views as such a dramatic era of change. In short, the Gareev “alternative” that English cites is actually a hard-liner version of retrenchment in
hindsight.
Second, also unmentioned by English is that in the same interview, Gareev
goes on to argue that the growing technological gap necessitated a drastic Soviet response: a crash course of investing resources and scientists in the development of military technology on the same scale as the Herculean effort to
28. Ibid., p. 89.
29. Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, eds., The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System:
An Insider’s Account (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 62. See also Makhmut Gareev, “Voennotekhnicheskaia politika: Retrospektivnyy analiz,” Problemy prognozirovaniia, No. 3 (March 1996),
pp. 163–167.
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match U.S. thermonuclear and missile capabilities in the 1950s.30 Any Soviet
leader presented with such a proposal would likely have mentioned to Gareev
that 80 percent of Soviet expenditures on science already went to military purposes; that increasing the proportion yet further was unlikely to bring about a
reversal of the growing military technological gap with the United States; and
that it would impose major opportunity costs on the general health of the Soviet economy.31 Extremely telling on this score is that in this same interview,
Gareev himself admits that many of the reforms that he and Ogarkov favored
“were doomed because our proposals were detached from an overall restructuring of our society, our political system, and our economy at large.”32
evaluating evidence about policy alternatives: four general guidelines
English’s effort to marshal evidence of an alternative aside, he also attempts to
challenge our ªnding in several other ways. These critiques ignore four
guidelines that need to be considered, however, when addressing the switchmen issue by examining the nature of opposition and policy alternatives.
First, place the nature of the opposition in context. In examining the opposition to Gorbachev’s foreign policy changes, we kept in mind the vast and wellestablished literatures in social science that tell us that major policy departures
always lead to signiªcant opposition due to factors such as bureaucratic interests and institutional structures. The question is not the existence of opposition
but its scope and effectiveness given the magnitude of change and the constituencies that it threatens. Reorienting fundamentally the foreign policy course
that the Soviet Union had followed for a generation was obviously a dramatic
change. And given that the country’s entire political economy was in critical
ways geared toward the production of military power, retrenchment clearly
threatened major constituencies. Had experts on Soviet politics and international relations been asked in the early 1990s what evidence of internal opposition to Gorbachev’s foreign policy strategy would come to light, most surely
would have expected evidence of a major alternative course “waiting in the
wings.”33 Measured against this expectation, what we ªnd most noteworthy
30. Ellman and Kontorovich, The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System, p. 63. Gareev stresses
that the technological gap was most pronounced in “reconnaissance technologies, navigation
equipment, target identiªcation systems, electronic countermeasures, computers—all the equipment which uses electronics.”
31. The source for the 80 percent estimate is Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York:
Doubleday, 1996), p. 215.
32. Quoted in Ellman and Kontorovich, The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System, p. 61.
33. This was indeed the expectation of one of us writing at that time. Wohlforth, “Realism and the
End of the Cold War,” p. 125.
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about the evidence that emerged subsequently is the weakness of the opposition it reveals. Contention concerned the terms, rather than the advisability, of
retrenchment.
English’s reply frequently reºects a preoccupation with the speciªc details of
individual decisions. When the analytical lens is concentrated on such ªnely
grained decisions, differences of opinion are almost always evident. This is frequently the stuff of policymaking, and it is not surprising that participants focus on it when revisiting their roles in larger events. But explaining, for
example, why the Soviets agreed to the inclusion of the Oka missile in the
INF talks in 1987 is not the same as explaining why they opted for a grand
strategy of retrenchment. We found the general pattern emerging from the
dozens of critical decisions that add up to the end of the Cold War to be consistent with our analysis. English, by contrast, interprets nearly any disagreement
and disgruntlement from old thinkers about particular policy decisions as
evidence of “concerted” opposition.34 This is a standard of evidence that
makes mountains out of what in a larger context are surprisingly small molehills.
Second, consider the free-rider problem carefully. By free riding we do not
mean that old thinkers could let Gorbachev do the tough work of implementing retrenchment policies with which they fully agreed. Rather, it means that
most of the old thinkers were not in positions where they were forced to confront the trade-offs implicit in any effort to deal with the Soviet Union’s growing problems. They could complain about Gorbachev’s course without
ultimately having to face the painful choices between guns and butter and between the present and the future. For example, English ªnds it very signiªcant
that Ligachev, in Odom’s estimation, “wanted reform but not at the expense of
the Soviet Union’s international military status.”35 Odom is no doubt correct on
this score. English does not mention that Odom goes on to quote Ligachev
himself that “we faced the task of curtailing military spending . . . the economy
could not breath normally with a military budget that comprised 18 percent of
the national income.”36 In short, Ligachev wanted to slash defense without
sacriªcing military power. Doubtless Gorbachev would have loved to have accomplished this. Who wouldn’t? Those in opposition are free to advance incompatible policy preferences without having to worry about how to resolve
them.
34. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 76.
35. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 92.
36. Ibid.

International Security 26:4 108

Third, bear in mind that leaders will be prone to select lieutenants who agree
with their basic assessments. Of course, these lieutenants may end up supporting new policy departures simply out of careerism. This is the basis upon
which English objects to the many statements that we presented in our article
from hard-liners that no alternative to retrenchment existed. To make this
point, English focuses on Marshal Dmitry Yazov—Gorbachev’s minister of defense who was also a leading participant in the August 1991 anti-Gorbachev
coup—who, as we quoted in our article, has stated unequivocally that there
was no alternative to retrenchment and that the Soviet Union had to follow
such a course (p. 46). English is skeptical of these statements and relies on a biography of Marshal Yazov penned by a like-minded friend and fellow ofªcer,
Lt. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, to try to undercut them.37
How can we determine whether a lieutenant’s retrospective claims of support for a new policy shift are the product of careerism, as English claims is the
case for Yazov? There are three basic steps to take, none of which English follows in his article: (1) examine evidence about the lieutenants from before they
were appointed; (2) after they are appointed, examine what kinds of analyses
and research they undertook before key policy shifts are undertaken and implemented; and (3) examine how they convinced others of the advisability of
policy shifts. In each of these three dimensions, the evidence on Yazov from the
very Ivashov source that English relies upon points to the signiªcance of growing economic constraints. First, Ivashov makes clear that, as we reported in our
article, Yazov and many of his fellow ofªcers were initially enthusiastic about
Gorbachev. They recognized that “the arms race and the military-strategic parity we had attained was exacting a stiff price” and associated Gorbachev with
their “yearning for radical changes.”38 Second, Ivashov notes that after he was
appointed minister of defense, Yazov had the Institute of Military History conduct an analysis of all military reforms in Russian and Soviet history dating
back to the early sixteenth century. Ivashov reports that Yazov was struck by
“the interdependence between the size and structure of the armed forces and
the state’s economic potential” and, of all the military reforms over the centuries, he was most compelled by the major troop cuts carried out after the Crimean War by czarist Defense Minister Dmitry Miliutin as part of a strategy for
modernizing Russia.39 Third, Ivashov notes that economic constraints were,
precisely as we argued, at the center of the arguments that Yazov deployed to
37. Leonid Ivashov, Marshal Iazov. Rokovoi avgust 91-go: Pravda o “putche” [Marshal Yazov. That
fateful August of 1991: The truth about the putsch] (Vel’sk: Vel’ti, 1993).
38. Ivashov, Marshal Iazov, pp. 9–10.
39. Ibid., p. 38.
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persuade his military colleagues of the necessity of painful reductions.40 In the
end, the Yazov case is simply a single instance of the general research ªnding
that we reported: Old thinkers acquiesced in or abetted retrenchment because
material conditions undermined any effort to do otherwise.
Fourth, when examining how incentives are likely to affect retrospective
claims concerning the existence of policy alternatives, apply those incentives to
all individuals, not just a select group. Given his portrayal of hard-liners, the
absence of any evidence of an alternative to retrenchment is a challenging puzzle for English. He argues that hard-liners face strong incentives to conceal all
such evidence of alternatives. English’s reading of incentives is highly questionable, however, and he also does not apply these incentives in a consistent
manner.
If anything, it would seem that hard-liners now face strong incentives to
show that “I proposed a more sensible course that would have worked, but
Gorbachev ignored it.” After all, by 1999, when the interviews that we cited
were conducted, the political climate in Russia had changed dramatically from
the immediate years after the 1991 coup, when the putschists faced trial and
jail. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and regret at the loss of great power status
were growing. If an old-thinking veteran had taken active measures to put forward an alternative to retrenchment, why not bring forth evidence to this effect? He would at least be able to demonstrate that he had tried—that he had
used his position in the government to ªght for the right course.
We found evidence of one old-thinking policy veteran who did take this
course: Oleg Baklanov. He, as we noted, went to Gorbachev with a memo arguing that defense was not a major burden on the Soviet economy. Although certainly not a full-ºedged alternative to retrenchment, this represented a move in
this direction by trying to undercut what was, as English admits, Gorbachev’s
strongest argument for proceeding with retrenchment. As we noted,
Baklanov’s initiative went nowhere—it did not provide a focal point for resistance to retrenchment. Why? We argue that it was because Baklanov’s argument that defense was not a major economic burden was simply not credible—
discussions at this time were carried out on the assumption that the military
40. English quotes at length from Ivashov’s description of the military’s disgruntlement over
Gorbachev’s unilateral conventional force reductions, announced in his famous speech to the
United Nations General Assembly in December 1988. Missing from the passage that English
quotes is this key sentence from Ivashov’s text: “At meetings of the [defense ministry’s] collegium
and other gatherings he [Yazov] forcefully implemented the policy of reducing the military forces,
and set forth the reasons—mainly economic—why we needed to go forward with disarmament.”
Ibid., p. 27.
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burden was punishing and had to be addressed.41 Large numbers of individuals were unlikely to stake their political careers on a patently wrong argument,
and hence it is no surprise that there is little documentary evidence of efforts
that measured up even to what Baklanov attempted.
English, by contrast, argues that the dearth of Baklanov-type evidence has
nothing to do with mounting economic constraints, but instead is due to the
fact that all old thinkers not only face strong incentives to conceal all evidence
showing the existence of alternatives but also have been completely effective in
doing so. If this is the case, then how does English explain Baklanov? English’s
answer is that “Baklanov has simply been more forthright than the others
about his opposition to new thinking.”42 But this raises a key question: Why
does English’s reading of current incentives not apply to Baklanov—whose
revelations have done nothing to harm his sterling reputation among his comrades as a Soviet patriot? In the end, English is right to raise the issue of incentives but apparently wants to have it both ways: Old thinkers can, in fact, be
trusted, but only if they provide evidence that matches up with his particular
reading of events.

Conclusion
Robert English possesses the talent, knowledge, and incentive to subject our
article to extraordinarily thorough scrutiny. Our analysis passes this tough test.
English endorses our basic empirical ªnding concerning the nature and magnitude of Soviet material decline. On the crucial issue of endogeneity, he acknowledges that Soviet economic decline constituted the most powerful
argument against opponents of foreign policy retrenchment. English was unable to ªnd any evidence of an alternative to retrenchment and fails to undermine our bottom-line conclusion that changing material incentives made
retrenchment the most likely policy response. Ultimately, his critique falls
short because it does not come to grips with our probabilistic framework, and
so is largely devoted to marshaling evidence against deterministic claims we
never made.
Needless to say, some of English’s criticisms hit home. Our analysis has the
advantage of being simple, easily exportable to other cases, and readily
41. As Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, p. 91, notes, “In the ªrst half of the 1980s a rather
wide and informal consensus was taking shape among all sectors of the party that. . . . dramatic action, particularly reductions in military spending, was imperative to deal with the impending crises. The ofªcer corps shared this view with party conservatives and reformers alike.”
42. English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence,” p. 109, n. 40.
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falsiªable, but English does underscore its inevitable limitations. Obviously, no
single factor can adequately explain everything that is interesting about this
case. In addition, English rightly criticizes us for implying that our analysis applied equally to the origins of new thinking and its actual translation into policy. We needed to be much clearer that, in raising the issue of endogeneity, our
focus was on the latter question. His sharp criticisms also compelled us to clarify the sets of observable implications that we examined to evaluate our causal
inferences. Finally, his overall response reºects a misunderstanding of our
probabilistic framework for evaluating causal weight that has prompted us to
articulate our approach more forthrightly here.
In the end, three things are clear. First, ideas are clearly part of the explanation for the way the Cold War ended. To be sure, the end of the Cold War did
not become the most important case study of the role of ideas in international
relations because scholars surmised that ideas merely played a role. The
event’s landmark status in the study of ideas clearly owes something to the
supposition that ideas were unusually or extraordinarily important. Our research does reveal that this initial supposition has not been borne out by the
latest evidence, which shows that retrenchment can no longer be considered to
be simply one of many equally probable responses to material decline.
Second, although the Cold War’s end is well documented, much archival evidence is not yet available. As English has argued elsewhere, such documents
should not be seen as the ªnal answer—particularly in the Soviet context.43 But
they may well provide the wherewithal to render far more conªdent judgments. And they may well undermine our central ªndings.
Finally, whether we like it or not, the ªeld of international relations learns
about theories from events like the end of the Cold War. One of the main reasons for our rigorous focus on research design and our search for greater precision on expressing causal weight is to ensure that further releases of evidence
do generate progress. By so doing, we have translated our basic ªnding into a
series of detailed predictions about patterns of evidence that will emerge.44 If,
by contrast, we stick with old thinking on qualitative research, then all we will
have are ambiguous claims about this or that cause “mattering” or being “necessary.” And then every archive in Russia could be wide open for a decade,
and nothing resembling progress would result.
43. Robert D. English, “Sources, Methods, and Competing Perspectives on the End of the Cold
War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 283–294.
44. See William C. Wohlforth, “Reality Check: Revising Theories of International Politics in Response to the End of the Cold War,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 675–679.

